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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to the proceeding below were Plaintiff Bonnie Huyot-Renoir and 
Defendant Kathleen Wilkinson. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES1 
L Did Ms. Huyot-Renoir Fail to Marshal The Evidence to Properly 
Challenge the Jury Verdict? 
Standard of Review: 
When reviewing a jury verdict, appellate courts view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict. Harding 
v. Bell 2002 UT 108,1f2, 57 P.3d 1093 (quoting State v. Krugen 2000 UT 60, % 2, 6 P.3d 
*Ms. Huyot-Renoir's "Issues on Appeal" section of her Brief completely fails to meet 
the important requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5). Her "issues on Appeal" section is 
more than eight (8) pages of a variety of information-mostly a re-arguing of her version of 
what she perceives the facts and evidence to have been. She never properly sets forth any 
issue, never provides a standard of review, does not properly cite to the Record, and makes 
no indication at all that any such issues were preserved in the trial court. Thus, the Brief 
should be stricken or disregarded, and the appeal dismissed pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24<j) 
("Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken . . .."). Ms. Huyot-
Renoir's Brief is difficult to respond to in view of its non-compliant structure and content. 
With that in mind, Ms. Wilkinson has done her best to respond to the Brief, and presents 
proper issues before this court-without conceding that any "issues" have been preserved and 
properly presented at all. 
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1116. To successfully attack a jury verdict, an appellant must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support it. See Harding 2002 
UT 108 atlf 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations omitted). 
Preservation Below 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir has not preserved a challenge to the jury verdict below; 
she did not object to it nor file any post-trial motions. She challenges the verdict for the 
first time on appeal. 
II. Did Ms. Huyot-Renoir Fail To Demonstrate Any Impropriety at 
Trial? 
Standard of Review 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir concedes throughout her brief that trial courts are 
afforded great latitude and discretion in the management of their court and the trial itself. 
See, e.g., Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997)(cited in 
Applt. Br. at7,21,and48). 
Preservation Below 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir has not properly preserved this or any issues below. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This personal injury action arises from an alleged rear-end automobile 
accident which Ms. Huyot-Renoir claims occurred almost nine (9) years ago, in August 
1997. The accident is referred to herein as an "alleged" accident because the Defendant, 
Kathleen Wilkinson, denied being involved in the accident at all,2 because expert 
testimony at trial demonstrated that the claimed damage to Ms. Huyot-Renoir's vehicle 
from the alleged accident (an extremely small "scratch" or two in the bumper of Ms. 
Huyot-Renoir's vehicle) could not have been caused by Mrs. Wilkinson's vehicle in view 
of the physical measurements and characteristics of the two vehicles, and because the jury 
found Ms. Huyot-Renior's claimed ailments were not caused by the alleged accident. Ms. 
2
 The fact that Ms. Renoir does not agree with Mrs. Wilkinson's testimony that she 
was not involved in the accident does not make her testimony "perjury" as baselessly argued 
by Ms. Renoir in her Brief. 
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Huyot-Renoir claims a host of physical ailments to the tune of several million dollars as a 
result of this alleged accident. 
B, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
After several years of discovery, many delays, extensions of time, and one 
last-minute trial continuance at the request of Ms. Huyot-Renoir, this case was finally 
tried to a jury, with the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on January 24-27, 2005. The 
jury returned a verdict of no cause of action, finding no proximate cause. A Judgment in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff was entered on February 28, 2005. The Judgment 
itself reflects the fact that "[t]he Special Verdict was properly returned, dated, and signed 
by the jury foreperson. No objections or exceptions were made to the final verdict before 
the jury was released/' {See Addendum 1) No post-trial motions or objections were filed. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir filed a Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2005, and this appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. In a Complaint filed by former counsel for Ms. Huyot-Renoir, she 
claims to have been injured in an alleged "hit and run" rear-end automobile accident 
almost nine (9) years ago, on August 21, 1997. (R. 1-5) 
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2. Defendant Kathleen Wilkinson denied being involved in the alleged 
accident. (R. 1722 at 268:8-11 & 306:4-9.) 
3. The case was tried to a jury for four (4) days, January 24-27, 2005. 
(R. 1720-1722) 
4. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause 
of action in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, finding no proximate cause. (R. 
1649-1651) 
5. The jury verdict was reduced to a Judgment, which was entered on 
February 28, 2005. (R. 1688; Addendum 1) 
6. There were no objections to the verdict or the resulting Judgment, 
and no post-trial motions were filed. (Applt. Br. at 10) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial of this matter was conducted fully, fairly, and properly, and the 
jury's verdict in favor of defendant, Ms. Wilkinson, should not be disturbed. If anything, 
Judge Noel erred in Ms. Huyot-Renoir's favor throughout the long history of the case and 
at the trial itself by giving her much more leeway and latitude than required. Now, 
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dissatisfied with the verdict, Ms. Huyot-Renoir is simply attempting to re-try her case on 
appeal. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir utterly fails to meet the critical requirements for 
appealing a jury verdict. She does not even attempt to marshal the evidence supporting 
the verdict, despite acknowledging in her Brief that this is required. (See Applt. Br. at 48-
49). She fails to cite to the Record as required; instead, she simply states what she thinks 
the facts and evidence were, or should have been, without demonstrating that such 
information was ever presented at trial. She also provides no proper statement of the 
issues with any standards of review or any indication that these "issues" were preserved 
for appeal. The fact that she ultimately chose to represent herself affords her no special 
treatment under the law. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir is improperly challenging a jury verdict by arguing that 
her case should have been believed rather that Mrs. Wilkinson's. She does nothing more 
than claim that the jury should have found in her favor in light of the evidence as she 
perceives it to be. Rearguing her case is wholly improper and insufficient to overturn the 
jury's verdict. When challenging a jury verdict, the appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the verdict, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites 
6 
cases confirming this requirement, but then instead of marshaling the evidence in support 
of the verdict, she re-argues her view of the case in the light most favorable to her 
version of events. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's Brief is fatally defective in other respects as well. For 
example, she "dumps the burden of argument and research" on this court. Her "facts" 
consist of nearly thirty-three (33) pages of one-sided, unsupported argument and re-
argument of the case below, without citation to the Record or any demonstration that such 
information was ever presented at trial. In fact, much of what she now argues on appeal 
was never presented at trial. Similarly her "Issues on Appeal" section consists of more 
than eight (8) pages of argument, atid foils to comply with the requirement tllat the issues 
be presented along with the applicable standard of review and supporting authority, as 
well as a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a(5)(A). Ms. Huyot-Renoir does not demonstrate that any of her 
issues were preserved below, by objection, motion, or otherwise. The requirements 
which she fails to meet are not mere technicalities, but rather important legal 
requirements based on long-standing legal principles that allow an appellee to properly 
respond, and this court to properly analyze and resolve litigated issues. 
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Ms. Huyot-Renoir's arguments about the manner in which Judge Noel 
conducted the trial are also without merit. Judge Noel went the extra mile on many, many 
occasions-not just during trial, but in the years before trial-to accommodate the plaintiff 
and give her more than ample latitude, leeway, and consideration. Ms. Huyot-Renoir 
cites the abuse of discretion standard concerning management of the trial court, but she 
ignores the import of that standard when it comes to the trial judge's management of the 
trial. The trial was conducted not only fairly, but with extreme deference and latitude to 
the plaintiff. In the end, the simple fact remains that the jury heard the evidence and then 
determined that there was no proximate causal connection between the claimed injuries 
and the alleged conduct of the defendant, Mrs. Wilkinson. The jury's verdict and 
resulting Judgment should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Ms. Huyot Renior Failed to Marshal the Evidence to Challenge the Jury's 
Verdict, and Even if She Had Properly Marshaled the Evidence, there is 
Ample Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict 
\ Ms. Huyot-Renoir Must be Held to the Same Standard as if She Were 
Represented by Counsel 
Before discussing Ms. Huyot-Renoir's failure to marshal the evidence and 
other failures, it should be noted that the law does not afford pro se litigants any special 
treatment. Ms. Huyot-Renoir emphasizes that she is representing herself, but as a pro se 
litigant Ms. Huyot-Renoir must be held to the same standards of practice as if she were 
represented by an attorney. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 & 1220 
(Utah 1983). "One has the right to appear pro se; but when a person chooses to do so, 
[she] must be held to the same standard as if [she] were represented by counsel." Johnson 
v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981), cited in Nelson, 699 P.2d at 
1213 & 1220. A pro se litigant "cannot be given an advantage by virtue of [her] pro se 
appearance, and [she] cannot be placed at a disadvantage thereby other than whatever 
disadvantage results from [her] decision to proceed without the assistance of counsel." 
Johnson, 630 P.2d at 517, cited in Nelson, 699 P.2d at 1213 & 1220; see also Manka v. 
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Martin, 614 P.2d 875, 880 (Colo. 1980) (explaining that while a litigant is permitted to 
present his own case, a pro se litigant's "ignorance [should not be] unjustly rewarded/' 
and explaining that a pro se litigant who chooses to proceed without counsel "must be 
prepared to accept the consequences of his mistakes and errors") (internal quotations 
omitted), cited in Nelson. 699 P.2d at 1213 & 1220. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cannot be 
afforded any special treatment just because she represented herself at trial. 
B, Ms. Huyot-Renoir Failed to Marshal the Evidence to Challenge the 
Jury's Verdict 
Ms. Huyot-Renior is appealing from a jury verdict. "A party claiming that 
the evidence does not support a jury's verdict carries a heavy burden." Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). To successfully attack a jury verdict, an 
appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, 
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it. See Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, ^ 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations 
omitted). "Put differently, a party incurs an obligation to marshal all of the evidence that 
arguably supports the jury's conclusion" Id, (emphasis in original.) "This means that 
[the appellant] must marshal 'every scrap' of evidence that supports the jury's finding." 
Id (quoting Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724). To properly marshal 
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the evidence, then, the appellant must "assume the role of 'devil's advocate,' . . . fully 
embrace the [appellee's] position," and then demonstrate how there is no evidence that 
can support the jury's verdict. Id at ^(19-20. If a party fails to marshal (he evidence, the 
court "must assume that the jury's conclusion was supported in the record." Hunt v. 
Burton, 2005 UT App 441, f3, (attached as Addendum 2), citing Harding, 2002 UT 108 
at f 19, 57 P.3d 1093. Ms. Huyot-Renoir acknowledges these requirements in her Brief, 
but she completely fails to apply them. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir completely fails to even attempt to undertake the task of 
marshaling the evidence at all, let alone meet her burden to do so. Instead of 
"marshalling] the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrat[ing] that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict," Harding, 
2002 UT 108 at ^ 19, 57 P.3d 1093, Ms. Huyot-Renior has simply reiterated her version 
of the case at great length. She emphasizes her opinion of how the facts should have been 
viewed, and insists that the evidence supports her position. This is clearly insufficient 
when challenging a jury verdict. Ms. Huyot Renoir failed to assume the role of devil's 
advocate; she never embraced the evidence that is favorable to the verdict, and then failed 
to demonstrated how that evidence cannot support the jury's verdict. Instead, she simply 
reiterated her distorted versions of the facts and the testimony of a multitude of witnesses. 
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Because Ms. Huyot-Renoir failed to marshal the evidence, the court "must 
assume that the jury's conclusion was supported by the record." Hunt 2005 UT App 441 
at p (citing Harding, 2002 UT 108 at U 19, 57 P.3d 1093). 
C. Even Assuming Ms. Huyot-Renoir Had Properly Marshaled the 
Evidence, there is Ample Evidence Supporting the Jury Verdict 
Ms. Huyot Renoir did not even attempt to marshal the evidence supporting 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. 
Even if she had attempted to do so, the evidence supporting the verdict was more than 
adequate. A few examples follow: 
1. Dr. Moress Testified That There Was No Causal Link Between 
the Accident and the Claimed Injuries 
Dr. Moress' testimony supports the jury's verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir points 
out that Dr. Moress testified that there was "no relationship between the accident and 
[her] symptomatology," (Br. of Applt. at 19), and that "[her] injuries were not a result of 
this accident." (Br. of Applt. at 22.) Indeed, Dr. Moress testified that, in his expert 
opinion, he did not believe that Ms. Huyot-Renoir was injured as a result of the alleged 
automobile accident. (R. 1719 at 25:5-16 & 62:2-23.) Dr. Moress further testified that 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's complaints reflected a psychological condition. (R. 1719 at 22:19 to 
24:14 & 26:15 to 27:1.) The fact that Ms. Huyot Renoir admits that Dr. Moress testified 
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that there was no causal connection between the alleged accident and Ms. Huyot-Renoir's 
alleged injuries is sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and the jury could have properly 
concluded from his testimony that Ms. Huyot-Renoir's injuries were not caused by the 
accident. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's complaints about Dr. Moress' opinions regarding her 
damages, such as the necessity or advisability of a surgery on her neck are completely 
irrelevant to this appeal. This testimony was related to the value of her claimed damages. 
Thus, the testimony of Dr. Moress concerning the surgery ultimately turned out to be 
unnecessary to the jury because the jury never reached the question of damages-having 
concluded no proximate cause existed. Once the jury determined that there was no causal 
connection between the alleged accident and the claimed injuries, there was no need to 
address injuries and damages. 
2, Ron Probert Testified That There Was No Accident Involving 
Ms Wilkinson 
Ron Probert's accident reconstruction testimony also supports the jury's 
verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir admits that Mr. Probert testified that "there was no physical 
evidence to suggest that it did occur," (Applt. Br. at 37) and that the damage to Ms. 
Huyot-Renoir's car could not have been caused by Ms. Wilkinson's car because the 
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bumpers of the two cars did not match up. (Br. of Appellee at 35-38.) Indeed, Mr. 
Probert testified that, in his expert opinion, Ms. Huyot-Renoir could not have been injured 
as a result of the alleged automobile accident involving Mrs. Wilkinson because, he 
opined, there was no accident between the plaintiffs car and the defendant's car. (R. 
1718 at 17:10-17 & 29:18 to 31:23.) Thus, the jury could have properly concluded from 
this testimony that Ms. Wilkinson did not cause the alleged damage and/or injuries 
claimed by Ms. Huyot-Renoir. 
3. David Ingebretsen Testified That There Was No Impaet and No 
Injuries 
David Ingebretsen's biomechanical engineering testimony also supports the 
jury's verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir admits that Mr. Ingebretsen testified that the physical 
evidence indicated that there was "no impact" and that Ms. Huyot-Renoir's injuries "were 
none," i.e., her injuries could not have resulted from the alleged accident. (Applt. Br. at 
39.) Indeed, Mr. Ingebretsen testified that, in his opinion, there was no impact between 
the plaintiffs vehicle and the defendant's vehicle, and therefore Ms. Huyot-Renoir could 
not have suffered injuries from the alleged accident. (R. 1722 at 316: 1-24.) Mr. 
Ingebretsen further testified that even assuming an accident between the two vehicles, 
there was insufficient force to have caused Ms. Huyot-Renoir's alleged injuries. (R. 
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323:11 to 324:11.) This expert testimony is sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and 
the jury could rightfully conclude from this testimony that Ms. Huyot-Renoir's injuries 
were not caused by the alleged accident with Ms. Wilkinson. 
The aforementioned testimony and admissions by Ms. Huyot-Renoir are 
just a brief sampling of the voluminous evidence that could—and did—lead the jury to find 
in favor of the Defendant, Ms. Wilkinson. Further elaboration is not necessary in view of 
the fact the Ms. Huyot-Renoir, and not Ms. Wilkinson has the burden of marshaling the 
evidence. In short, Ms. Huyot-Renoir failed to marshal the evidence, but even if she had 
marshaled the evidence, there is ample evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
IN 1 s 11 ii) ill •  iiffitiii has Dumped the Burden of Argument and Research 
This may also properly dismiss Ms. Huyot-Renoir's appeal for "dumping 
the burden of argument and research" and failing to comply with Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(9). Utah appellate courts are not "'a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research."' State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations omitted.). Utah appellate courts do not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed. See, e.g., Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-05 (citing 
cases for the proposition that issues which lack legal analysis and authority in support are 
15 
properly rejected by appellate courts). An argument is adequately briefed if it contains 
"the contentions and reasons of the [briefing party] with respect to the issues presented ... 
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9). In other words, Rule 24(a)(9) requires citation to legal authority, 
development of that legal authority, and reasoned analysis based on that authority, and 
Utah R. App. P. 24(j) provides that non-complaint briefs may be "disregarded or 
stricken." Ms. Huyot-Renoir has failed to present her appeal in a coherent matter as 
required by Utah R. App. P. 24, and therefore this Court may disregard Ms. Huyot-
Renoir's appeal as an unnecessary burden on judicial resources based upon Rule 24(j) and 
the "no dumping" rule. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir fails to identify any appealable issues or coherently 
present any facts relevant to a legal issue on appeal. She fails to identify what her case is 
about in her "Statement of the Case," (Applt. Br. at 1.), and in her section entitled "Issues 
on Appeal," she fails to identify or coherently articulate any legal issues; and because she 
articulates no legal issues, she also fails to identify how any issue was preserved for 
review or the standard for review of any such issue. Her statement of facts consists of 
thirty-six (36) pages of her own one-sided, distorted version of the "facts," without proper 
record citations. (Applt. Br. at 9-43.) Ms. Huyot-Renoir5s argument section, entitled 
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"Summary Law Argument," clearly dumps the burden of argument and research. Ms. 
Huyot-Renoir fails to develop any legal authority, and she offers no reasoned analysis 
based on that authority. (Applt. Br. at 43-49.) She offers no legitimate reason or 
supported argument why the District Court may have erred in nay respect. Finally, at the 
end of her argument section, Ms. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites a handful of cases that articulate 
what must be done to attack a jury verdict, but she does nothing to develop this legal 
authority or apply it. (App. Br. at 47-49.) In short, Ms. Huyot-Renou has Mumped the 
burden of argument and research," and as such her appeal may be properly rejected. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981) (dismissing pro 
se appeal for the above-illustrated reasons). 
111. The Various Complaints Mae By Ms. Huyot-Renoir Throughout Her Brief 
W Without Merit 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir complains about many things in her Brief without 
identifying any legal issues. Her "Issues on Appeal" section is not really a statement of 
the issues on appeal at all, much less one complying with Utah R. App. P. 24. Instead, it 
is a long and winding narrative of her version of what the evidence was, what the jury 
should have believed, and how the trial should have been conducted. Ms. Huyot-Renoir 
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fails to set forth any issues, much less any standards of review for such issues, nor any 
indication at all that any "issues" were preserved for appeal. Instead, she complains about 
a variety of things at random throughout the Brief These complaints need not be 
reached by this Court at all in view of the foregoing arguments made in this Brief 
Nonetheless, Ms. Wilkinson has attempted to address the many complaints that she 
perceives to exist in the Brief for the sake of completeness and to demonstrate that even if 
these had been properly preserved below and presented on appeal, none of them would 
have any impact on the result in this appeal. 
A- Jury's Determination of No Proximate Cause 
After four (4) full days of trial, the majority of which were dedicated to Ms. 
Huyot-Renoir's case-in-chief, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Special Verdict was signed, dated and returned. No 
objections or exceptions were made to the final verdict before the jury was released, and a 
Judgment was entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendant on February 28, 2005. 
No post-trial motions or objections were made. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir concedes that the jury found no proximate cause, but she 
still insists that the jury should have reached the "overwhelming" evidence of her claimed 
damages. Ms. Huyot-Renoir misunderstands the law. It is simple, black-letter law that if 
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the jury finds either no negligence or no proximate cause, then that is the end of the 
inquiry, and damages are not even to be considered, much less awarded. The Special 
Verdict, which she approved before it was given to the jury, reflects these fundamental 
legal requirements, and it was properly entered by the jury and incorporated into the 
Judgment. Ms. Huyot-Renoir did nothing to preserve this issue below and did not make 
any motions or objections to the Special Verdict Form or to the verdict itself once 
rendered by the jury. To the contrary, she approved it before it went to the jury, and did 
nothing until her Notice of Appeal to raise any concern about the verdict. While she 
clearly disagrees with the jury's determination of no proximate cause, her dissatisfaction 
with the verdict and her desire that they consider her claimed damages and award money 
damages are misguided and have no basis in the law for revisiting the issue on appeal. 
Moreover, she has completely failed to even attempt to marshal the evidence or otherwise 
properly challenge the jury verdict. 
B, Denial of Legal Aid 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir argues, with no proper supporting authority, that her 
inability to obtain free legal aid to try her case is somehow grounds for appeal. This, like 
the other issues raised, affords her no relief. The argument that England may do things 
differently than the United States of America is not a viable argument that this case 
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should be reversed on appeal. Ms. Huyot-Renoir did have counsel at various times in the 
underlying litigation. Whether these attorneys withdrew of their own accord or whether 
she dismissed them is unknown, but she did have representation at times. Ultimately, she 
elected to try the case herself. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites absolutely no authority for the 
proposition that she is entitled to free legal representation in a civil, personal injury case. 
Moreover, this issue was never presented below nor preserved for appeal. 
C. Ten (10) Day Jury Trial 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir also complains that Judge Noel should have allowed her 
ten (10) days of trial for this simple personal injury action. She was allowed to call more 
than ten (10) witnesses within the four (4) day trial, and she was allowed by the Court and 
counsel for defendant to take the vast majority of trial time. Judge Noel made it clear-
well before trial commenced—that this type of case should last 2-3 days, that 4 days would 
be more than adequate, and that she needed to plan accordingly. Ms. Huyot-Renoir was 
allowed sufficient time to call her designated witnesses, and none of her witnesses were 
prevented from testifying due to any time constraints. 
As for Ms. Huyot-Renoir's physical ability to try the case, Judge Noel 
continued the trial once at the request of her doctor, and trial then took place only after 
Judge Noel had received written confirmation from Ms. Huyot-Renoir's own doctor that 
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the proposed trial schedule would be acceptable in view of her claimed medical 
condition(s). Throughout trial, Judge Noel consistently asked about her physical 
condition and ability to continue, and she never indicated that she could not continue. To 
complain now is to simply ignore her own conduct and acquiescence at trial. She always 
consented to the trial schedule, and when asked if she was able to continue, she always 
agreed.. She never objected to continuing on during any of the days of trial, and she 
certainly makes no citation to the Record wherein she mad any such objection or request. 
She cannot now use the length of trial days, especially where she consented to them, as an 
excuse to overturn the jury's verdict. Again, as with the other issues raised in this appeal, 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites no authority for the appropriate number of days for this simple 
personal injury trial. 
D. CPA and Biomechanical Expert Testimony 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir also contends that she should have been allowed to have 
a CPA and a biomechanical expert testify at trial, or that Judge Noel should have let her 
testify as an expert in those fields instead. She even goes so far as to say that Judge Noel 
told her he would allow her to testify as an expert in these fields. This is not true and, 
once again, she provides absolutely no citation to the Record to support that assertion. 
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Judge Noel properly excluded these two experts well before trial. Ms. 
Huyot-Renoir designated twenty (20) experts-including herself and her mother- but 
never designated a biomechanical engineer or CPA as experts. While it may be true that 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir retained them some time before trial, it is undisputed that she did not 
ever disclose them to counsel for defendant, and neither of these experts ever produced an 
expert report, as required under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R. 
1721, pp. 261-62). Hence, their exclusion was not only proper, it was required.3 Again, 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites no authority at all for the proposition that she should have been 
able to call these undisclosed expert witnesses at trial. Thus, for several reasons, 
including the failure to provide a report or otherwise make their identity and opinions 
known as required under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Noel 
properly excluded these two experts from testifying at trial. 
E. Evidence of Future Medical Expenses 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir also asserts that she should have been allowed to present 
to the jury evidence of various future medical expenses. Contrary to her assertion in her 
Brief, she was not told categorically that she could not present such evidence. A long 
3
 Judge Noel notes the long and tortured history of the case, and the many problems 
occasioned by Ms. Huyot-Renoir. (R. 1721 at p. 262) 
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discussion was held on the Record concerning this issue. (See R. 1721, at pp. 188-199). 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir attempted to argue (and even testify herself) to the jury about future 
medical expenses without ever having laid any foundation for them. Judge Noel did 
allow certain future expenses to be argued to the jury (those with evidentiary support 
presented during the trial), but he properly declined to permit her to simply attempt to tell 
the jury what she thought her future expenses would be without any proper evidence 
before the court. (See R. 1721 at pp 188-199). 
More importantly, analysis of this issue by this Court is not warranted 
because the issue is moot. The jury concluded that there was no causal connection 
between the alleged accident and plaintiffs professes injuries. Thus, even if she had 
presented everything she wished to present to the jury concerning damages, it would not 
have mattered. Once the jury found no proximate cause, it properly ended its 
deliberations and returned its verdict without considering any types of damages. Thus, all 
issues concerning damages are irrelevant. 
F. Dr. Rosenthal 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir argues that she should have been allowed to call Dr. 
Rosenthal, one of her many treating physicians, to testify. Dr. Rosenthal was being called 
only to discuss the cost of a certain medical procedure. She was attempting to call him as 
23 
a fact witness, not an expert, but more importantly his testimony went only to the question 
of damages (i.e. the cost of a certain procedure), and the jury never reached the question 
of damages. Thus, this issue is also immaterial. 
G. Dr. Moress 
In addition to complaining that Dr. Moress should not have testified about 
the necessity of a neck surgery (See Section I B above), Ms. Huyot-Renoir also complains 
that Dr. Moress should not have been identified as an "independent" medical examiner. 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir cross-examined Dr. Moress at great length regarding the percentage of 
work he does for defendants, as well as many other questions about practice, his methods, 
qualifications, and other issues. Thus, she had ample opportunity on cross-examination to 
demonstrate that, in her view, he was not an "independent" medical examiner. There was 
simply no error. 
Additionally, Ms. Huyot-Renoir's contention that counsel for Ms. 
Wilkinson "promised" to modify the tape containing Dr. Moress' videotaped deposition 
testimony is flatly wrong. The Record plainly shows a stipulation between the 
parties-after a long discussion on the Record outside the presence of the jury-that all 
videotaped depositions, including that of Dr. Moress, would be played to the jury "as is," 
with no modification or alteration at all. (See R. 1720, p. 70). This is yet another instance 
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of Ms. Huyot-Renoir making statements and representations to this Court that either have 
no support in the Record, or simply and plainly contradicted by the Record. 
IV. Improper Addenda 
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's Addenda are largely irrelevant or improperly before 
this Court pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1)(C) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Most 
of the items are not properly part of the Record. For example, Addendum 1 (the 
photograph of Plaintiff) is irrelevant, and her representation that this photo depicts her "as 
the jury saw me" (Applt. Br. At 1) is untrue. She admitted in a recent deposition in 
another matter (a case in which she is claiming that a spiritual blessing by representatives 
of the LDS church in 2000 is the cause of her claimed injuries) that the photo is of her 
head, but she cut-and-pasted it onto the body of someone else because "I like that dress." 
{See Addendum 3). The only Addenda that are properly before this court are Nos. 2, 6, 8, 
and 11, and those have no bearing on the outcome of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the jury's verdict 
and resulting Judgment in favor of Defendant Kathleen Wilkinson. 
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DATED this 3 day of February, 2006. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
T^RIAN C. WEBBER 
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY 
Attorneys for Kathleen Wilkinson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
instrument were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, and as otherwise indicated below, on 
this 3y^ day °f February, 2006, to the following: 
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR, pro se 
1107 E. South Temple, No. 1 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Pro Se Appellant 
x 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\06016\2278\H08185.WPD 
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ADDENDUM 1 
AGED 
BRIAN C. WEBBER [8018] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
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inird Judicial D^trict 
FEB 2 8 2005 
pU-T LAKE COUNTY 
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DATE. 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHLEEN WILKINSON & JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010907017 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This action was tried to a jury, The Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on 
January 24-27, 2005. Plaintiff was present and represented herself, pro se. Defendant was 
present and represented by her attorney, Brian C. Webber, of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
At the close of evidence, jury instructions, and closing arguments, the jury entered its verdict, as 
follows, on the Special Verdict Form: 
1. Was the defendant Kathleen Wilkinson negligent as alleged by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
JD16848998 
010907017 HUYOT-RENOIR.BONNIE 
2. Was the defendant Kathleen Wilkinson's negligence, if any, a proximate cause 
of the injuries sustained by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If you answered either question no. 1 or 2 "no" then do not answer any more 
questions, but have the foreperson sign this form and return to the courtroom. If 
you answered both question no. 1 and 2 "yes" then go on to the following 
questions. 
The Special Verdict was properly returned, dated, and signed by the jury 
foreperson. No objections or exceptions were made to the final verdict before the jury was 
released. The Court finds that defendant is entitled to costs as the prevailing party, pursuant to 
Rule 54(d). Plaintiff is not entitled to costs. 
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered as follows: 
1. Judgment is entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendant. Plaintif 
shall take nothing by way of any of her claims; and 
2. Costs are awarded in favor of defendant in the amount of $ ^rjlO 
which shall constitute a Judgment against plaintiff.
 A 
f V ^ , , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
*L %*-
DATED this ^-f day of _ 
District Judge 
" « * « K - - > ' 
ll/brt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this Q(<A day of ^Aaa\^<^-. *, 2005, to the 
following: 
Bonnie Huyot-Renoir 
187 E. 600 N. 
Midway, UT 84049 
X 
6016-2278 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\06016\2278\F59243. WPD 
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ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Vance Hunt, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John Burton, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050065-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 14, 2005) 
2005 UT App 441 
Second District, Ogden Department, 030904184 
The Honorable Scott M. Hadley 
Attorneys: Rex B. Bushman, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Michael J. Boyle, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Vance Hunt appeals from a jury verdict in favor of John 
Burton. Specifically, Hunt argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's conclusion that while Burton 
assaulted Hunt, the assault did not cause Hunt's alleged 
injuries. 
"A party claiming that the evidence does not support a 
jury's verdict carries a heavy burden." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "To successfully attack the verdict, 
an appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict 
and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to 
support it." Id. "Put differently, a party incurs an obligation 
to marshal all of the evidence that arguably supports the jury's 
conclusion. This means that it must marshal 'every scrap' of 
evidence that supports the jury's finding." Harding v. Bell, 
2002 UT 108,1(19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations omitted). Hunt has 
wholly failed to meet his burden to marshal the evidence. 
Hunt challenges the jury's verdict because while the jury 
found that Burton committed an assault on Hunt, it did not find 
that the assault caused Hunt the injuries or damages he claimed.1 
Instead of marshaling all evidence that supports the juryfs 
verdict, Hunt provides us with the testimony of his own doctor 
who stated that in his opinion the assault caused the claimed 
injury. This is not marshaling of the evidence that supports the 
verdict. The record reveals numerous facts and inferences that 
would support the jury's verdict. Hunt was required to marshal 
these facts then explain to the court why they were legally 
insufficient. Because Hunt has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the juryfs conclusion that the assault did not cause 
his claimed damages, we must assume that the jury's conclusion 
was supported in the record. See id. 
Affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
1Hunt does not argue that the jury erred by failing to award 
him nominal damages. Accordingly, we do not address that issue 
on appeal. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
Civil No. 040500468 BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR, 
Plaintiff, 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah 
corporation, STERLING D. 
ANGLE, GARY HANSON, and 
Does I through V, 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF: 
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR 
TAKEN: January 23, 2006 
-ooOoo-
Deposition of BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR, taken on 
behalf of the Defendants, at the offices of Kirton & 
McConkie, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, before Jill C. Dunford, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah, pursuant to Notice. 
-ooOoo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff 
Pro se: 
For the Defendants: 
Bonnie Huyot-Renoir 
1107 East South Temple, #1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Thomas D, Walk, Esq. 
Christian S. Collins, Esq. 
KIRTON 8c McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple 
Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
I N D E X 
WITNESS 
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR 
Examination by Mr. Collins 
PAGE 
2 
filed? 
pages. 
at it. 
A. I'm not sure. I haven't looked at it. 
Q. Well, actually we have gone through so many 
Does it look like anything is different? 
A. It could be the exact one. I haven't looked 
7 Q. I'm going to represent that it is the exact 
8 one. It's your brief. We just photocopied it. It even 
9 has your photo there in Addendum 1. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q-
A. 
Uh-huh. 
Right there? 
Oh, uh-huh. 
Is that a photo of you? 
Yeah. 
The head and the body? 
Doesn't it look like me? No, I like that 
17 dress. It's my head. 
18 That's your head, but you put it on someone 
19 else's body? 
20 A. I like that dress. That's the only photo I 
21 had that was recent. 
22 Q. I'm going to actually attach this as Exhibit 
23 2 to the deposition. 
24 (Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.) 
25 Q. Do you have know any questions, Bonnie? 
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